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1  | MA JOR INCIDENT EMERGENCIES: 
CONTEMPOR ARY UK CONTE X T
Recent terrorist attacks (e.g., Manchester Arena, Borough Market, 
and Houses of Parliament), the Grenfell Tower fire, and natural 
disasters are examples of major incident emergencies in the UK 
(henceforth major incidents). A consistent lesson that has been iden‐
tified from recent analyses of major incidents is the need to develop 
interoperability: “the capacity of organisations to exchange opera‐
tional information and to use it to inform decision‐making” (NPIA, 
2009, p. 12; for a recent review, see House, Power, & Alison, 2014; 
see also, Alison & Crego, 2008; Comfort, 2007; Pollock, 2013). For 
example, Pollock (2013) identified the failure of different agencies 
(e.g., local emergency services, civil resource organizations, health 
boards, and government) to work together at a strategic level, as an 
issue in the UK and elsewhere. One important component of the 
approach to improving interoperability in the UK is embodied in 
multi‐agency groups who are convened and charged with making 
decisions that help to minimize the societal and economic impacts 
of major incidents. These Strategic Coordinating Groups (SCGs) 
include senior representatives of the relevant agencies, including 
local emergency services, civil resource organizations, health agen‐
cies, and government. Similar regional approaches have evolved 
elsewhere (see, for example, Palm & Ramsell, 2007; Wimelius & 
Engberg, 2014). SCGs consider the incident in its wider context, de‐
fine and communicate the overarching policy and strategy for the 
emergency response, and monitor progress towards defined objec‐
tives. This strategy‐setting role extends beyond the initial response 
to the incident and includes formulating a media and communica‐
tion strategy as well as horizon scanning to facilitate the recovery 
stage of an incident. SCGs receive nationally endorsed guidance and 
training, a central pillar of which is the Joint Decision Model (JDM; 
Figure 1). This UK practitioner model was introduced to support 
the capacity of multi‐agency groups to work together. The model 
was based on the Police National Decision Model, and before that 
the Conflict Management Model (National Decision Model, https://
www.app.college.police.uk/app‐content/national‐decision‐model/
the‐national‐decision‐model/#application).
The JDM is the normative decision‐making framework that is 
used to guide the response to major incidents in the UK. It is docu‐
mented in the nationally agreed Joint Doctrine that provides guid‐
ance to agencies that are required by the Civil Contingencies Act, 
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2004 to respond to emergencies. Agencies expected to use the 
JDM include legally defined “Category 1 responders” such as local 
authorities, Police forces, Fire and rescue services, the National 
Health Service (NHS), and environmental agencies. “Category 2 re‐
sponders” are also expected to use the JDM and include large‐scale 
transport providers such as road, railway, and airport agencies, as 
well as essential utility providers such as electricity, gas, water, and 
telecommunication companies.  In spite of its importance in the UK 
public sector and its integral role in responding to major incidents, 
there has been no research on the way that the JDM is used by 
SCGs to support decision‐making. The principal aim of our research 
was to meet this important unmet need by assessing the consis‐
tency with which these groups use the JDM. This was achieved by 
investigating decision‐making in SCGs engaged in immersive simu‐
lated incidents and a large‐scale exercise. There are good grounds 
for supposing that the approach embodied within the JDM might 
not be used in the context of group decision‐making from research 
in the field of naturalistic decision‐making (e.g., Klein, 1993, 2003, 
2008). We consider this research after describing the JDM.
2  | SUPPORTING INTEROPER ABILIT Y:  THE 
JDM
Strategic Coordinating Group members come from a range of or‐
ganizations and major incidents are infrequent, which means that 
these groups face issues that differ from those faced by expert 
teams, who frequently work together on familiar tasks (e.g., cock‐
pit flight crews: Stout, Cannon‐Bowers, Salas, & Milanovic, 1999; 
nuclear operations personnel: O'Connor, O'Dea, & Flin, 2008; 
ship navigators: Hutchins, 1995a; for a review, see Flin, 1996). 
The ad hoc nature of SCGs allows them to rapidly assemble in 
the affected location with key local knowledge, but it also means 
that they might not have worked together at a major incident (cf. 
Rouse, Cannon‐Bowers, & Salas, 1992; see also, Cannon‐Bowers 
& Salas, 2001), which could reduce their capacity to develop a co‐
ordinated plan of action (Stout et al., 1999). The JDM was adopted 
in an attempt to meet these challenges: to enhance interoperabil‐
ity, engender a shared representation of an incident (cf. Hutchins, 
1995a, 1995b, Nickerson, 1993), and enable a coordinated re‐
sponse through shared superordinate goals (cf. Power & Alison, 
2017a, 2017b; Rouse et al., 1992; Stout et al., 1999).
The JDM describes five categories of decision‐making activity, 
which support the superordinate goals of working together, saving 
lives, and reducing harm. These activities are as follows: (1) gather 
information and intelligence; (2) assess risks and develop a working 
strategy; (3) consider powers, policies, and procedures; (4) identify 
options and contingencies; and (5) take action and review what hap‐
pened. The five activities can be broadly aligned to the more ge‐
neric decision‐making processes of situation assessment (activity 1), 
plan formulation (activities 2–4), and plan execution (activity 5; e.g., 
Lipshitz & Bar‐Ilan, 1996; van den Heuvel, Alison, & Power, 2014). 
The JDM also describes a consistent sequence in which these ac‐
tivities should occur, moving from gathering information to taking 
action through the three intermediate activities. While there has 
been no formal assessment of whether the JDM engenders such a 
consistent approach to decision‐making in SCGs, there is evidence 
from the field of naturalistic decision‐making suggesting that it is 
unlikely to do so.
3  | NATUR ALISTIC DECISION‐MAKING
The field of naturalistic decision‐making is concerned with under‐
standing how people make decisions in real‐world contexts, in‐
cluding those where the decisions involve high stakes, are time 
pressured and occur in a context of uncertainty (e.g., Klein, 1993, 
2003, 2008; Klein et al., 2003; see also, Doya, 2008; Gigerenzer, 
2007; Gureckis & Goldstone, 2006; Hodgkinson & Healey, 2008; 
Shafir, 1994; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). That is, the field is con‐
cerned with exactly those conditions in which SCGs operate. To take 
one example, the study of decision‐making in individual firefighters 
has revealed marked departures from normative models that are 
similar to the JDM: Firefighter decision‐making often reflects past 
experience and is recognition‐primed and intuitive rather than being 
based on a process of evaluation and reflection. This observation 
was originally highlighted through an analysis of the retrospective 
reports of firefighters (Klein, Calderwood, & MacGregor, 1989; see 
also, Klein, 1998); but it is also evident when decision‐making was in‐
vestigated in situ at real emergency incidents (Cohen‐Hatton, Butler, 
F I G U R E  1   The JDM identifies five categories of activity 
involving: gather information, develop strategy, consider powers, 
identify options, and take action. The central ethos of the model 
is: Working Together, Saving Lives, and Reducing Harm. [Joint 
Emergency Services Interoperability Programme (JESIP), Joint 
Doctrine: The Interoperability Framework. Adapted from: http://
www.jesip.org.uk/joint‐decision‐model]
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& Honey, 2015; see also, Rake & Njå, 2009) and simulated incidents 
(Cohen‐Hatton & Honey, 2015). Similarly, the failure to consider al‐
ternative interpretations of evidence has been widely documented 
in laboratory studies (e.g., Wason, 1966) and in police investigations 
(e.g., Dando & Ormerod, 2017). Indeed, Dando and Ormerod (2017) 
have highlighted the fact that current practice in the police (in par‐
ticular the use of decision logs) might constrain the explicit genera‐
tion of alternative interpretations of evidence by (less experienced) 
police detectives investigating serious crime.
There is already evidence suggesting that experienced prac‐
titioners do not follow normative models of decision‐making; and 
there is a broader literature which has identified the pitfalls and 
benefits of making decisions in groups rather than individually (for a 
recent review, Bang & Frith, 2017). Thematic analysis of interviews 
with multi‐agency group members, after they have participated in 
simulated major incidents, alongside other evidence which suggests 
that timely action can be constrained by decision inertia (e.g., Power 
& Alison 2017a, 2017b; Alison et al., 2015; see also Janis, 1972, 1982; 
Janis & Mann, 1977). Here, decision inertia refers to “a process of 
(redundant) deliberation over possible options and in the absence of 
any further useful information” (Power & Alison, 2018); which could 
interact with whether a group is tolerant of uncertainty or not (e.g., 
Frenkel‐Brunswik, 1949; see also, van den Heuvel et al., 2014; for 
reviews, see Furnham & Marks, 2013; Hillien, Gutheil, Strout, Smets, 
& Han, 2017). Moreover, the separation of “assess risks and develop 
a working strategy” from “identify options and contingencies” within 
the JDM might have the unforeseen consequence of limiting rather 
than encouraging the consideration of alternative options (cf. Dando 
& Ormerod, 2017; Wason, 1966). On a different tack, Bang and Frith 
(2017) have argued that group decision‐making might be improved 
by combining individuals with different decision‐making styles: ex‐
plorers, who sample the available information and decision space in 
order to select the optimal decision, and exploiters, who commit to 
a course of action without such an analysis, but based on the prior 
success of that action. At the moment, there is no formal assess‐
ment of the decision‐making styles of SCG members. Consequently, 
the likelihood that different SCGs will contain a combination of indi‐
viduals with different decision‐making styles is a matter of chance. 
However, there has been no evaluation of the use of the JDM by 
SCGs in the UK. Without such an evaluation, there is no basis upon 
which to determine the utility of the JDM in (a) reducing decision 
inertia or the issues identified by Pollock (2013) or (b) harnessing 
the benefits and avoiding the pitfalls of group decision‐making more 
broadly (Bang & Frith, 2017).
4  | SIMUL ATED MA JOR INCIDENTS
To provide a detailed (real‐time) analysis of the use of the JDM, we 
studied multi‐agency groups who faced the same simulated major 
incidents. Previous studies of how multi‐agency groups respond to 
simulated major incidents have made use of immersive simulation 
suites in which the groups are convened and respond to a virtual 
event (e.g., Crego, 1996; see also, Power & Alison, 2017a, 2017b; van 
der Haar, Koeslag, Euwe, & Segers, 2017; for a review, see Alison et 
al., 2013). In Study 1, this approach was adopted in order to inves‐
tigate the use of the JDM by 18 SCGs who were responding to the 
same simulated incidents within a single critical meeting. The meet‐
ings were recorded, and the decision‐making sequences, involving 
the five JDM activities, were derived from these recordings. Coding 
the sequences in this way provides a common frame of reference for 
researchers and practitioners. If the provision of the JDM engenders 
similar processes of group decision‐making, then the sequences of 
activities should be correspondingly similar across different groups 
and should match those described by the JDM. However, if there are 
marked differences in the sequences of decision‐making activities 
between different groups or from those embodied in the JDM, then 
the nature of such differences will provide an important evidence 
base for future policy, guidance, and training. To take one example, 
if decision inertia affects decision‐making in a SCG then this might 
be evident in repeated cycles of transition between gather infor‐
mation and develop a working strategy, or a general reluctance to 
take action (cf. Alison et al., 2015; see also, van den Heuvel et al., 
2014). Study 2 assessed the generalizability of important compo‐
nents of the results from Study 1 using the same methodology. It 
involved six successive SCG meetings that occurred over the course 
of a large‐scale exercise that involved live‐play conditions and more 
closely matched a real major incident. Here, the SCG meetings were 
an ongoing component of an event that included the recreation of a 
London Underground tunnel collapse, with the extended fallout that 
such an event would have on society and the economy.
The specific research questions that underpinned our analysis 
of the use of the JDM by SCGs in Studies 1 and 2 were as follows:
1. What is the distribution of decision‐making activities during 
independent SCG meetings?
2. Is the sequencing of decision‐making activities consistent across 
SCGs?
3. What is the distribution of decision‐making activities across suc‐
cessive SCG meetings?
4. Does the sequencing of decision‐making activities change across 
successive SCG meetings?
5  | METHOD
5.1 | Participants
5.1.1 | Study 1
Eighteen multi‐agency groups attended 2‐day national training and 
exercise events in Study 1 (nine groups from Exercise Wales Gold 1 
and 9 groups from Exercise Wales Gold 2; see Table 1 for additional 
information). The total number of participants in Study 1 was 147. 
Each training event consisted of opportunity samples of participants 
who had applied and were selected by their agencies to take part on 
the basis of prior involvement in a SCG, having been on call to attend 
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a SCG, or the possibility of future involvement in a SCG based on 
their rank. Participants were employed by the emergency services 
(Ambulance Service, Fire and Rescue Service, and Police), Health 
Boards, Local Government, Natural Resources Wales, and Public 
Health Wales, and ranged in seniority from Chief Executive level to 
a recently promoted Police Chief Superintendent. The experience of 
participants varied considerably: Some had served as a member of a 
SCG or had undertaken some relevant training to prepare them for 
such a role, while others had received no formal training for a role 
in SCGs. However, the groups were composed of participants who 
could, if an immediate need arose, be part of SCGs faced with a major 
incident. The participants from Study 1 provided informed consent 
for their participation in accordance with ethical approval through 
Cardiff University; and those in Study 2 (from Exercise Unified 
Response, EUR) provided informed consent through their agencies.
5.1.2 | Study 2
The participants in the SCGs in Study 2 represented the emergency 
services (City of London Police, London Ambulance Service, London 
Fire Brigade, Metropolitan Police), Civil Contingencies Secretariat, 
City of London Corporation, Department of Communities and Local 
Government, Environment Agency, Transport for London, and London 
Underground Limited. They were selected on the basis of their seniority 
and experience. There was a core set of participants that attended each 
of the six SCG meetings, and there was some turnover in participants 
over the course of the exercise. For example, the Chair of the SCGs 
changed across the meetings: SCG meetings 1 and 2 (a male repre‐
sentative of the Metropolitan Police), and meetings 3–6 (a female and a 
male representative of the Local Government; see Table 1 for additional 
information). A majority of the participants in Study 2 participated to 
more than one SCG meeting; but the total headcount (including multiple 
attendances by the same person as part of the count) was 142.
5.2 | Procedure
5.2.1 | Study 1
At the start of each training event, all participants took part in an 
interactive session that lasted for approximately one hour. This ses‐
sion covered the consistent and nationally recognized UK emergency 
command control and coordination structures (Cabinet Office, 
2013), the decision‐making role of SCGs, and the use of the nation‐
ally endorsed model for making collective decisions in an emergency 
(i.e., the JDM). The virtual timeline of the scenarios extended from 
the afternoon of Day 1, when the incident was declared to 3 months 
later through intermediate time points (evening of Day 1, Day 2, and 
1 week later).
5.2.2 | Hydra simulations
The Study 1 scenarios were delivered using Hydra immersive sim‐
ulation systems (Alison et al., 2013; Crego, 1996). Hydra provides a 
“syndicate room” for each group, which was equipped with a large 
screen projector, PC, wireless keyboard and mouse, printer, and 
CCTV. Large posters of the JDM were displayed prominently on 
the wall of each of the syndicate rooms and were visible to all 
participants. The PC ran a communication interface that was per‐
manently displayed on the projector screen and delivered informa‐
tion updates (“injects”) and tasks to the groups. Exercise control 
staff also received and responded to all written communications 
sent by the groups using the Hydra communicator. GoPro cameras 
(GoPro Hero 3, Half Moon Bay, USA) and CCTV were used to re‐
cord meetings in Studies 1 and 2.
5.2.3 | Study 1 scenarios
Both scenarios were multi‐faceted, dynamic, and involved time 
pressure. The scenarios were developed so that there were no ex‐
plicitly correct or incorrect critical decisions and that all agencies 
would be engaged. They were managed by control room staff who 
delivered scripted updates on the scenario at pre‐defined times 
via tasks, video and audio clips, and printed documents. The first 
scenario began with a video update from the Police tactical com‐
mander. This update stated that there was a large‐scale chemical 
fire at an industrial site and the nearby road network and railway 
line were closed due to the resulting plume of smoke. The scenario 
then developed into a serious environmental and economic inci‐
dent with media impacts that required decisions on longer‐term 
recovery issues regarding health impacts, housing, decontami‐
nation, and economic recovery. The second scenario also began 
with a video update from the Police tactical commander, which 
included information about a crash between a passenger train 
and a truck carrying a hazardous substance. The crash caused 
many fatalities and injuries to passengers. Within the first hour 
of the incident, a fire ignited, burning the hazardous substance 
and sending a toxic plume of smoke over a residential area. Across 
the two days of the event, the groups took part in meetings that 
were approximately 45–60 min, during which they made decisions 
in response to the evolving incident. The analysis for Study 1 was 
conducted on the critical second SCG meeting. In this meeting, 
there was time pressure and the groups were required to make 
critical decisions involving providing direction to those involved in 
tactical operations, what their media strategy would be (Exercise 
Wales Gold 1); and whether or not to evacuate a nearby caravan 
site, under conditions where the resources were not available to 
evacuate everyone and the toxic effects of the plume were un‐
clear (Exercise Wales Gold 2).
TA B L E  1   Group sizes and composition
Mean (range) Female:Male
Study 1 8 (6–10) 1:2.22
Study 2 24 (20–28) 1:2.97
Note. The mean number of participants in each group together with the 
range, and the ratio of female to male participants.
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5.2.4 | Study 2 scenario
Study 2 was based on a large‐scale exercise involving the collapse 
of the London Underground at Waterloo Station. Exercise Unified 
Response extended over four consecutive days in 2016 and repre‐
sented the largest emergency response exercise ever undertaken 
in the UK. It involved multiple sites and the SCGs met in one of 
the special operation rooms in a Police headquarters in Central 
London. The six scheduled SCG meetings occurred at 17 00 on Day 
1, at 12 00 and 17 00 on Day 2, at 12 00 and 17 00 on Day 3, and at 
12 00 on Day 4; and the duration of the meetings ranged from 45 to 
65 min. The SCGs interfaced with a tactical command group, a gold 
command group, and Cabinet Office Briefing Room (COBR). There 
was also a Media Cell, Recovery Group, Mass Fatalities Group, and 
Scientific and Technical Advice Cell. The SCGs received informa‐
tion from the site where the London Underground collapse was 
created, complete with buried carriages, over 4,000 responders, 
and 2,500 trapped casualties, many with realistic stage make up 
and injuries.
5.3 | Coding of activity
The audio‐video recordings were coded using the categories of 
activity from the JDM: gather information and intelligence (e.g., 
“We need more information about how injuries were sustained”); 
assess risks and develop a working strategy (e.g., “What is the risk 
of evacuating people?”); consider powers, policies, and procedures 
(e.g., “Can we control the airspace to legally prevent helicopters 
from taking footage?”); identify options and contingencies (e.g., 
“If we move people out and the fire burns for two weeks where 
will they go?”); and take action and review what happened (e.g., 
“Initiate mutual aid plan”). These activities were coded directly 
from the videos, and the codes were accompanied by notes on 
the same spreadsheet, which described the content of the coded 
activities. The activities were scored at the level of the group, in‐
dependently of the individual. The fact that the meetings were 
chaired meant that the meetings had a coherent structure that 
was readily coded as a sequence of activities. Isolated comments 
that were either irrelevant or were not part of the discussion (e.g., 
informal asides, which were infrequent) were excluded from the 
analysis. The coding was conducted on two separate occasions (by 
B.W.), which resulted in a small number of the activities (<5%) being 
re‐classified. An independent assessor (R.C.H.) then confirmed 
the reliability of the coding on a sample of 30 observations from 
each	study	(≈95%	agreement	with	B.W.).	A	lag	sequential	analysis	
(Sackett, 1979; see also, O'Connor, 1999) was used to derive the 
primary data of interest: the sequences of transitions between 
different decision‐making activities in the group meetings. In this 
analysis, the decision‐making activities were coded as a continu‐
ous stream, with repetitions of the same category removed. The 
lag sequential analysis stopped at the end of the SCG meetings. 
The resulting sequence of decision‐making transitions was then 
compared to the binary transitions within the JDM (Figure 1).
6  | RESULTS
6.1 | Study 1: What is the distribution of decision‐
making activities during independent SCG meetings?
We first considered the frequency with which a given category 
of activity occurs without consideration of what happened be‐
fore or after that category of activity occurred. The overall fre‐
quencies are shown in Figure 2 in the form of stacked columns. 
The left‐most column shows the mean number of each of these 
categories for the 18 groups in Study 1. Three categories of ac‐
tivity dominated: gather information, develop strategy, and take 
action; while the frequencies of the remaining categories (consider 
powers and identify options) were low. These frequencies were 
analysed using a mixed ANOVA, with activity (e.g., gather infor‐
mation) as a within‐subjects factor (with five levels), and study as 
a between‐subjects factor (with two levels: Exercise Wales Gold 
1 or 2). This analysis confirmed that there was a main effect of 
type of transition (F(4, 64) = 72.97, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.82), no ef‐
fect of Wales Gold 1 or 2 (F(1, 16) = 2.74, p = 0.12, η2p = 0.15), and 
no interaction between these two factors (F < 1). Pairwise com‐
parisons, with a Bonferroni correction, confirmed that there were 
significant differences between each pair of activities (ps < 0.005) 
with the exception of between gather information and take action 
(p > 0.50). The pattern of statistical significance was as follows: 
develop strategy > gather information = take action > identify op‐
tions > consider powers.
6.2 | Study 1: Is the sequencing of decision‐making 
activities consistent across SCGs?
The analysis of the results from Figure 2 showed that there was con‐
sistency across the SCGs in the overall frequency of categories and 
their distribution. However, this analysis does not establish whether 
the sequences of activities were consistent across the different 
F I G U R E  2   Each bar indicates the frequencies of the five 
categories of decision‐making activities in group meetings. The left‐
hand bar shows the mean frequencies for the 18 groups in Study 
1. The remaining bars show the frequencies of these categories for 
the six meetings in Study 2 (SCGs 1–6)
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groups. The mean frequencies of transition from one category to 
each of the other categories are shown in Table 2, together with the 
range of frequencies. Inspection of this table shows that the number 
of transitions involving the three main categories (gather informa‐
tion, develop strategy, and take action) were higher than those in‐
volving the other categories (consider powers and identify options). 
This simply reflects the fact that these categories of activity were 
more frequent. Of more interest, is the fact that there was marked 
variability in the frequency of transitions involving the three remain‐
ing categories (i.e., gather information, develop strategy, and take 
action) across the different groups; as is evident from the ranges 
(shown in brackets). For example, while the mean number of tran‐
sitions from gather information to develop strategy was 5.39 the 
range was between 2 and 10 transitions across the groups. The basis 
of this variability is explored in the next section.
A principal components analysis (PCA) assessed whether the 
variability in decision‐making sequences was simply noise or had 
some underlying structure. PCA is a data reduction technique that 
identifies interrelationships (i.e., structure) between a set of vari‐
ables, and through this process reduces the set to a smaller number 
of variables (called components or classes). For the three dominant 
categories (gather information, develop strategy, and take action), 
there are six possible binary transitions (e.g., develop strategy‐>take 
action). For each of the 18 groups, the frequencies with which each 
of the six transitions occurred are the primary data: a matrix of 
numbers with 18 rows (one for each group) and six columns (the 
possible sequences). PCA examines the extent to which any of the 
six sequence types (the columns) can be combined because the val‐
ues in them are correlated. If the variability identified in Section 6.2 
was noise, then this would be evident as the values being randomly 
arranged across the columns and no structure would be revealed by 
PCA. In fact, the PCA (which converged in three iterations and used 
a varimax rotation and Kaiser normalization) revealed two classes 
with eigenvalues of >1: Class 1 can be labelled “action‐oriented” 
and involved four of the transitions: develop strategy‐>take action, 
take action‐>develop strategy, take action‐>gather information, 
and gather information‐>take action (all factor loadings > 0.76). 
Class 2 can be labelled “information‐oriented” and involved the two 
remaining transitions: gather information‐>develop strategy and 
develop strategy‐>gather information (both factor loadings >0.95; 
there were no cross class loadings > ±0.13). That is, the variability in 
the six sequences could be reduced to two components or classes, 
labelled “action‐oriented” and “information‐oriented.” These two 
transition classes accounted for 74% of the variance in the six tran‐
sitions between the three activities. A schematic that presents the 
action‐oriented and information‐oriented classes of transition is 
depicted in Figure 3.1
6.3 | Study 2: What is the distribution of decision‐
making activities across successive SCG meetings?
The overall distribution of activities across each of the six SCG 
meetings in Study 2 is also shown in Figure 2 (SCGs 1–6 from 
Exercise Unified Response). The distribution of the categories in 
these meetings was similar to those in the left‐most bar (i.e., Study 
1). In spite of the differences in the number of participants in the 
groups in Studies 1 and 2, and the different scale of the exercises, 
TA B L E  2   Mean numbers of transitions in Study 1 (with ranges in brackets)
Gather information Develop strategy Consider powers Identify options Take action
Gather information X 5.39 (2–10) 0.22 (0–2) 0.78 (0–3) 1.11 (0–4)
Develop strategy 3.78 (0–9) X 0.17 (0–1) 1.05 (0–4) 4.67 (2–9)
Consider powers 0.17 (0–1) 0 X 0.39 (0–2) 0.05 (0–1)
Identify options 0.83 (0–3) 1.28 (0–5) 0.17 (0–2) X 0.72 (0–2)
Take action 1.94 (0–6) 3.00 (1–5) 0.05 (0–1) 0.89 (0–4) X
Note. The scores represent the mean number (plus range) of transitions between the five Joint Decision Model categories; for example, the mean num‐
ber of transitions from gather information to develop strategy was 5.39, whereas the mean number of transitions from develop strategy to gather in‐
formation was 3.78. The bold values indicate transitions between the most frequent categories of activity (i.e., gather information, develop strategy, 
and take action).
F I G U R E  3   Study 1: Schematic of the two sequence transition 
classes involving the most frequent categories of activity. The 
groups differed in the extent to which their transitions were more 
or less action‐oriented (tan arrow) or more or less information‐
oriented (red arrow)
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the dominant categories of activity in Study 2 were also gather in‐
formation, develop strategy, and take action; with the frequencies 
of consider powers and identify options being very low. ANOVA 
conducted on the scores from the six group meetings in Study 2, 
with type of transition (with five levels) as the within‐subjects fac‐
tor, confirmed that there was a main effect of type of transition (F(4, 
20) = 67.56, p < 0.001, η2p = 0.93). Pairwise comparisons, with a 
Bonferroni correction, revealed that the frequency of three activi‐
ties (gather information, develop strategy, and take action) differed 
from the two other activities (consider powers and identify options; 
ps < 0.01); and there were no differences between the frequencies 
of transition involving the activities within each of these two sets 
(i.e., gather information = develop strategy = take action > consider 
powers = identify options).
6.4 | Study 2: Does the sequencing of decision‐
making activities change across successive SCG 
meetings?
The analysis of the variability in the sequencing of decision‐making 
activities that was performed in Study 1 cannot be conducted on the 
results of Study 2, because only one SCG was making decisions at 
a given time point, as the exercise developed. However, a comple‐
mentary analysis can be conducted that allows the development of 
the transitions between the three dominant activities to be tracked 
across successive meetings of this large‐scale exercise. Figure 4 de‐
picts this evolution in the frequencies of transitions from: gather 
information to either develop strategy or take action (upper panel); 
develop strategy to either take action or gather information (mid‐
dle panel); and take action to either gather information or develop 
strategy (lower panel). Inspection of the upper panel shows that dur‐
ing each SCG, gather information was more likely to be followed by 
develop strategy than take action (binomial test, p < 0.05). The mid‐
dle panel shows that during each SCG, develop strategy was more 
likely to be followed by take action than gather information (binomial 
test, p < 0.05). Finally, the lower panel shows that while in the first 
SCG, take action was more likely to be followed by develop strategy 
than by gather information, by the final SCG this pattern of transi‐
tions had reversed and take action was more likely to be followed by 
gather information than develop strategy (Fisher's exact probabil‐
ity test, p < 0.05). The final observation shows that the sequencing 
of decision‐making activities changes over the life of an extended 
incident.
7  | SUMMARY AND PRINCIPAL RESULTS
Strategic Coordinating Groups play a central role in how the UK re‐
sponds to major incidents. A pillar of UK national operational guid‐
ance is the JDM. We investigated the use of the JDM in multi‐agency 
groups in simulated major incidents created in Hydra suites (Study 1) 
and in a large‐scale live‐play exercise (Study 2). Decision sequences 
were generated by first categorizing group activities within the 
meetings in terms of the five categories that form the basis of the 
JDM (Figure 1), and then examining the transitions between these 
categories. There was a consistent distribution of the five activities 
across the different groups, with three dominant activities (gather 
information, develop strategy, and take action), and two categories 
of activity that were relatively infrequent (consider powers and iden‐
tify options). However, this consistent distribution belied marked be‐
tween‐group differences in the nature of the transitions between 
the dominant activities. There were two classes of decision‐making 
transitions involving (a) develop strategy and take action, and take 
action and gather information, and (b) gather information and de‐
velop strategy. To give a concrete illustration, two SCGs might have a 
similar overall number of transitions involving developing a strategy, 
but for one group these based on transitions to‐and‐from take action 
whereas for another they might be based on transitions to‐and‐from 
F I G U R E  4   Study 2. Frequency of transitions from gather 
information to either develop strategy or take action (upper panel); 
from develop strategy to either take action or gather information 
(middle panel); and from take action to either gather information or 
develop strategy (lower panel)
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gather information. Finally, the analysis of a series of meetings 
across an extended incident showed that our form of analysis was 
sensitive to changes in the distribution of decision‐making activities 
across the event. Most notably, while taking action was most likely 
to be followed by revisiting strategy development in SCG meeting 1, 
it was most likely to be followed by gather information in SCG meet‐
ing 6. Further work involving extended incidents will be needed to 
understand the basis of this change, and whether it is a consistent 
feature of different groups or is itself subject to variability between 
groups. For example, the change in decision‐making sequences be‐
tween SCG meetings 1 and 6 might reflect the changing nature of 
the issues faced early and late in a major incident, or an increasing 
need for gather information about the immediate (or ongoing) con‐
sequences of actions. In the following discussion, we focus on three 
facets of our studies: The variation in how the groups approached 
the simulated incidents (Study 1); the fact that there was limited con‐
sideration of powers or identification of options in all groups (Studies 
1 and 2); and the nature of the methodology employed here. We 
conclude by examining the implications of our results for policy, 
guidance and training.
8  | DISCUSSION
Our investigation provided the first analysis of the use of the JDM 
to support decision‐making in multi‐agency groups. The groups were 
faced with realistic, simulated major incidents. We did not evaluate 
the effectiveness of the different groups, including the decisions 
that they made (cf. van der Haar et al., 2017), but rather the process 
of decision‐making (cf. e.g., Klein, 1993, 2003, 2008). The findings 
summarized in the immediately preceding section have clear theo‐
retical and operational significance.
8.1 | Between‐group variability in 
transition sequences
There were marked between‐group differences in the transitions 
between the three main categories of decision‐making activity. The 
groups differed in the extent to which their sequences were “action‐
centred” or “information‐oriented.” These labels are not intended to 
describe a process of decision‐making, but are simply a convenient 
and theoretically neutral way of labelling the different classes of de‐
cision‐making sequences that were evident across the groups. The 
basis for these group differences cannot be determined from the pre‐
sent results, but some speculation can be offered. For example, the‐
matic analysis of interviews with members of multi‐agency groups, 
after they have participated in simulated major incidents, revealed 
high levels of decision inertia (Power & Alison 2017a, 2017b; Alison 
et al., 2015; see also Janis, 1972, 1982; Janis & Mann, 1977). In Study 
1, decision inertia might be reflected in high levels of the informa‐
tion‐oriented component and low levels of the action‐oriented com‐
ponent. Our results thereby complement those based on thematic 
analysis of interviews with individual group members; but they also 
suggest that decision inertia differs markedly across different SCGs 
that are responding to the same incident. The same form of argument 
can be made about a given group's tolerance for uncertainty or ambi‐
guity, which might be reflected in their tendency to exhibit frequent 
transitions between gather information and develop a strategy (e.g., 
Frenkel‐Brunswik, 1949; see also, van den Heuvel et al., 2014; for re‐
views, see Furnham & Marks, 2013; Hillien et al., 2017). These group 
differences, whether they involve decision inertia or tolerance of un‐
certainty, are likely to be based upon differences in the composition 
and characteristics of the groups or the disposition of the chair (van 
der Haar et al., 2017). In this context, a recent analysis of the benefits 
and pitfalls of group decision‐making is directly relevant.
Bang and Frith (2017) highlighted the possibility that differences 
in the tendency of individuals within a group to explore or exploit 
information could affect that group's overall tendency to continue 
to gather information rather than to act on the basis of existing in‐
formation (Frank, Doll, Oas‐Terpstra, & Moreno, 2009; Tversky & 
Edwards, 1966). It seems plausible to link the information‐oriented 
and action‐oriented classes of decision‐making sequences to group 
differences in exploration and exploitation: Groups with many ex‐
plorers being more likely to exhibit information‐oriented sequences 
and those with many exploiters being more likely to exhibit action‐
oriented sequences. To test this analysis would require the deci‐
sion‐making styles of the individuals to be assessed prior to their 
allocation to groups: Would groups that are composed of explorers 
or exploiters (or a mixture of the two) differ in their decision‐mak‐
ing sequences, and if so would these differences impact on critical 
decision‐making? We will return to this issue in the final section of 
the discussion where we offer some specific suggestions about how 
the issue of the variability in the sequencing of decision‐making ac‐
tivities could be addressed in future policy, guidance, and training.
8.2 | Limited consideration of powers or 
identification of options
A consistent feature of the SCGs was the limited consideration of 
powers or identification of alternative options. This finding might 
simply reflect that there was a shared understanding of the avail‐
able powers for a given situation. However, this explanation is 
much less plausible in the case of the failure to identify different 
options. In Study 1, the number of actions taken were many and 
varied (e.g., to evacuate buildings, to activate the mass fatalities 
plan), and yet there was little consideration of alternative options. 
Moreover, in Study 2 the potential for identifying different options 
across the developing incident was manifold, and yet there was 
little or no attempt to do so in the six SCG meetings. This failure 
to explicitly identify different options has also been observed in 
studies of individual decision‐making, where decisions have been 
characterized as being experience‐based (e.g., Gigerenzer, 2007; 
Shafir, 1994; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) or recognition‐primed 
(Klein, 1993, 2003; see also, Doya, 2008). The failure to consider 
alternatives has been associated with poor group decision‐making 
(for a review, Walker, McLeer, & the DAMOCLES group., 2004). In 
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the context of SCGs, the limited identification of options and con‐
tingencies could be generated in a variety of ways. For example, 
a need to maintain group harmony could serve as a constraint on 
the evaluation of alternative courses of action and contingencies 
(Janis, 1972, 1982); and the extent to which the chair is perceived 
as inclusive and the environment psychologically safe might mod‐
erate the tendency of individuals to contribute alternative views 
or speak up (e.g., Bienefeld & Grote, 2014). There are a variety of 
ways in which encouraging the explicit consideration of alternative 
options could be addressed in future policy, guidance, and train‐
ing, which will be considered in the final section of the discussion.
8.3 | Methodological considerations
Some of the results presented in the previous paragraphs were en‐
abled by the fact that there was a relatively large sample of groups 
in Study 1 (i.e., 18) engaged in the same scenarios. However, one 
cost of the increased reproducibility that the use of simulations af‐
fords is that they lack some of the features of real major incidents; 
including the fact that group decisions at real major incidents have 
consequences (e.g., saving lives, preventing further casualties and 
damage to property and the environment). This is a limitation of 
Study 1. However, the close correspondence between decision‐
making processes in some operational and simulated environ‐
ments, identified using similar methodology to the present studies 
(Cohen‐Hatton et al., 2015; Cohen‐Hatton & Honey, 2015), sug‐
gests that use of context appropriate simulated environments 
can reveal important similarities to real incidents (Alison et al., 
2013). Of more immediate relevance, however, is the close simi‐
larity between the overall pattern of results from Study 1 (involv‐
ing Exercise Wales Gold 1 and 2) and Study 2 (Exercise Unified 
Response; Figure 2). This similarity—across exercises of very dif‐
ferent scales—supports the view that our results are of relevance 
to real major incidents; but complementary analyses of real SCG 
meetings, dealing with a range of different major incidents, is the 
only way to determine whether or not this view is accurate.
8.4 | Implications for future policy, 
guidance, and training
With the limitations noted above borne in mind, the results from 
Studies 1 and 2 do provide a context‐sensitive basis upon which 
to develop future policy, guidance, and training. One obvious tar‐
get is to modify policy and guidance to ensure that (a) options and 
contingencies are consistently explored, and (b) the rationale for 
prospective courses of action are routinely and explicitly assessed 
against goals, anticipated consequences, and a risk/benefit analy‐
sis (cf. Cohen‐Hatton & Honey, 2015). Cohen‐Hatton and Honey 
(2015) showed that training firefighters to use such explicit assess‐
ments (which they called “decision controls”), before committing to 
a course of action, increased the use of reflective decision‐making 
relative to recognition‐primed or intuitive decision‐making. The im‐
plementation of such decision controls in a group decision‐making 
context might also yield greater reflective decision‐making, involv‐
ing appropriate consideration of alternative options and goals. 
However, the between‐group variation in decision‐making pro‐
cesses, coupled with the infrequent evaluation of options and 
contingencies, also highlights a need to consider the dynamics of 
group working rather than the development of prescriptive mod‐
els of decision‐making per se. In fact, there are relatively simple 
techniques (e.g., considering views from outside of the group; Janis, 
1972, 1982) that enhance the quality of group decision‐making in 
some contexts (Lovallo & Kahneman, 2003; Ministry of Defence, 
2013; see also, Newell, Lagnado, & Shanks, 2015), and which could 
be integrated into how multi‐agency groups respond to major inci‐
dents (cf. Exercise Unified Response Evaluation Report, 2017, pp. 
142–143). However, there is another potential route to changing 
group dynamics that is based on a recent theoretical analysis of 
group decision‐making that was briefly mentioned above.
Bang and Frith (2017) presented an analysis of how the past ex‐
perience of group members could be integrated with new informa‐
tion to affect group decisions. Their (Bayesian) analysis is broadly 
consistent with the naturalistic decision‐making approach, which is 
also concerned with how previous experience primes decisions in 
the face of uncertain information (i.e., recognition‐primed or intui‐
tive decision‐making; Klein, 1993, 2003, 2008; see also Doya, 2008; 
Gigerenzer, 2007; Gureckis & Goldstone, 2006; Salas, DiazGranados, 
& Rosen, 2010; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). In the case of multi‐
agency groups, bringing together representatives from the relevant 
agencies might well increase their ability to work together effectively 
(but see, Power & Alison, 2017a, 2017b). However, Bang and Frith 
(2017) argued that group decision‐making might also benefit from 
the combination of different types of individual decision maker: spe‐
cifically from the combination of explorers and exploiters. There are 
clearly pitfalls associated with being either an explorer (who might 
not reach a decision in a timely fashion) or an exploiter (who might 
quickly reach the wrong decision), and Bang and Frith (2017) rea‐
soned that “A mixture of such diverse individuals can create advan‐
tages for the group.” As already mentioned, this claim needs to be 
assessed experimentally, but it has clear practical implications for as‐
sembling effective groups in a variety of contexts, including at major 
incidents (cf. Polzer, Milton, & Swann, 2002; Roberge & van Dick, 
2010). At present, the selection of individuals that come together 
to respond to major incidents (simulated or real) in the UK is not 
based on any formal assessment of their individual approaches to 
decision‐making. The foregoing analysis suggests that such selection 
might provide a means of increasing the consistency and efficacy of 
decision‐making processes in multi‐agency groups.
To conclude: The JDM is a central to the UK public sector. The 
results of Studies 1 and 2 suggest that future policy, guidance, and 
training should focus on ways to enable the JDM to be used more 
consistently and effectively by SCGs. Greater consistency could be 
achieved by ensuring that SCGs include a balance of individuals with 
different decision‐making styles (i.e., explorers and exploiters; see 
Bang & Frith, 2017), which might also reduce decision inertia (Power 
& Alison 2017a, 2017b; Alison et al., 2015). However, there is a need 
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to investigate whether the decision‐making processes of SCGs, and 
groups more generally, are affected by the decision‐making styles 
of their members. At a more specific level, our results suggest the 
need for SCGs to give more consistent and explicit consideration to 
alternative plans of action. The use of decision controls has proven 
effective in modifying decision‐making in incident commanders 
(Cohen‐Hatton & Honey, 2015), but this technique has yet to be for‐
mally assessed in SCGs or other groups.
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ENDNOTE
1The sample size for Study 1 (n = 18) is low for a PCA, but complemen‐
tary analyses using simple correlations to assess relationships among 
the 6 sequences (for which the n is suitable) provided statistical sup‐
port for the components derived from the PCA. 
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